Monopolostic competition, aggregation of competitive information, and the amount of product differentiation by Kumar, K. Ravi, 1951- & Satterthwaite, Mark A.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
e? /. ^ «- *-

?s
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 925
%
-#%
Monopolostic Competition, Aggregation of
Competitive information, and the Amount
of Product Differentiation
9,$
K. Ravi Kumar
Mark A. Satterf.hwaita
Jcmrnerce and Business Administration
eaj oi Ecnnornic and Business Research
nois, Urfcana-ChampaJgri

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 925
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
February 1983
Monopolistic Competition, Aggregation of Competitive
Information, and the Amount of Product Differentiation
K. Ravi Kumar, Assistant Professor
Department of Business Administration
Mark A. Satterthwaite
Northwestern University
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/monopolisticcomp925kuma
Abstract
Product differentiation in an industry of identical firms may be
said to exist if the firms choose equilibrium strategies that result in
the firms' taking actions that are not identical. For example, if two
firms within an industry of idential firms set different prices in
equilibrium, then that is a product differentiated equilibrium. This
paper considers a monopolistically competitive industry in which there
are a large number of price-setting firms having identical technologies
and demand functions that result in smooth profit functions. The
paper's main result concerns the maximal amount of product differentia-
tion that can arise. Specifically, suppose the demand function of each
firm depends parametrically on k different statistics of the strategies
ether firms in the industry are following. Examples of such statistics
might be average price, the variance of price, average advertising, etc.
Then, if the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is structurally stable, the firms
in the industry can separate at most into k+1 nonempty classes where
every firm in each class follows a strategy that is distinct from the
strategies firms within other classes follow.
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Monopolistic Competition, Aggregation of Competitive
Information, and the Amount of Product Differentiation
by
K. Ravi Kumar and Mark A. Satterthwaite
Introduction
The graphical technique that Chamberlin (1962, pp. 81-100) developed to
analyze equilibrium within a monopolistically competitive industry
incorporates the assumption that only aggregate statistics of competing firms'
strategic choices affect an individual firm. This assumption crops up in his
discussion of his Figure 14, which we have reproduced as our Figure 1: "The
curve dd
'
, then, explains why each seller is led to reduce his price; the
curve DD' shows his actual sales as the general downward movement takes
place. The former curve 'slides' downwards along the the latter as prices are
College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign and J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
Northwestern University respectively. Satterthwaite gratefully acknowledges
the support of KGSM's Center for Advanced Study in Managerial Economics, the
Health Care Financing Administration through a grant to Northwestern 's Center
for Health Services and Policy Research, and the National Science Foundation
without any implication that they endorse or approve this work.
l Chamberlin (1962, p. 91).
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2lowered, and the movement comes to a stop at the price of AR. " In other
words, the position of the dd ' curve depends on the general, or average, level
of competitors' prices.
Our purpose in this paper is to show that this aggregation of competitive
information is a strong assumption that restricts on the variety of equilibria
that can be observed for a monopolistically competitive model. We do this
within a model whose key features are that the number of firms is large, firms
are prohibited from employing mixed strategies, and each firm's profit
function is parameterized by one or more statistics of the other firms'
strategies. Thus each firm's profit depends on its own strategy and, for
instance, the average price that competing firms are charging. With an
elementary example we show that each firm's profit function in such a model
may violate quasi-concavity and cause nonexistence of an equilibrium that is
symmetric in the sense that in equilibrium every firm chooses an identical
strategy. In such cases, however, an equilibrium generally exists that is
asymmetric.
Let M be the number of statistics of competing firms' strategies that
parameterizes each firm's profit function. Our main result is that the
industry equilibrium generically involves the firms employing at most M+l
distinct strategies. Consider as an example an industry where price is each
firm's strategic variable and the average price charged by competitors
parameterizes the profit function. Then generically only two types of
equilibria can exist: a symmetric equilibrium where each firm charges the
2Chamberlin (1962, pp. 91-92).
Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) showed that a pure strategy equilibrium
may fail to exist for a the Cournot model even if its demand and cost
conditions are completely nonpathological. Our example is thus an
illustration of their point within a different context.
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identical price and an asymmetric equilibrium where firms divide into a group
of low price sellers and a group of high price sellers. If, by coincidence,
an equilibrium should exist where firms divide into more than two groups, then
almost any perturbation of the firms' profit functions collapses the
equilibrium to either of the two generic possibilities. For the purposes of
positive analysis such structurally unstable equilibria are uninteresting
since they are unlikely to be ever observed.
Our result shows the extent to which asymmetric equilibria may exist
within monopolistically competitive models. That asymmetric equilibria do
exist in industries that we normally think of as being monopolistically
competitive is supported by casual observation. For example, some firms
advertise much more than other firms that are in the same line of business and
apparently have the same strategic capababilities. Also, discount retail
establishments seem to coexist with nondiscount retail establishments. Since
these strategic differences persist beyond the length of time that firms
require to copy a competing, more successful firm's strategy, the underlying
reason for the asymmetry must be that the equilibrium allows identical firms
pursuing widely divergent strategies to earn identical or almost identical
profits.
We divide the paper into three sections beyond this introduction. In
Section 2 we discuss in detail a simple example of a model where firms have
two strategic variables, price and advertising, and where other firms' average
price parameterizes each firm's profit function. The only equilibrium in this
model is asymmetric. It illustrates all the main points of the paper.
Section 3 presents our formal model and results. Section 4 contains a few
concluding remarks.
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An Example
Description . Our example is a model of a raonopolistically competitive
industry composed of a large number of firms, each supplying a single good
that is highly, but not perfectly, substitutible for every other firm's
good. Through their search activities consumers are informed of the prices of
a sample of firms. The rate at which consumers substitute between the
products of two particular firms about which they have knowledge varies across
consumers because each product has certain idiosyncratic characteristics
(subtle aspects of style, location, etc.) that different consumers react to
differently and are very hard or impossible for firms to fully control.
Therefore if each firm sets the same price, then among those firms about which
a consumer has knowledge he or she selects that good whose idiosyncratic
characteristics most closely fit his or her preferences. As a result each
firm has a spectrum of customers that range from those who just marginally
prefer its product over some other firm's product to those who really like its
product and are very loyal. Consequently as a firm raises or reduces its
price slightly the quantity demanded from it varies smoothly.
Each firm controls two variables: the price it charges and the quantity
of advertising it purchases. Demand and cost conditions are perfectly
symmetric among the firms, which means that they all have identical profit
functions ir (p . , A.; p.) where p. > is the price firm i charges, A. > is
the amount of advertising firm i purchases, and p. is the average of the
A model with demand of this type is developed in Satterthwaite (1979).
The smoothness of demand that this particular model exhibits is not essential
to our main argument.
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prices firm i 's competitors charge. Its form is
n(p
i' V Pi } = p i f(p i' V P i } " Ai
where f is the demand function.
f(p., A., p\) = (a + bp.) + (p. - p.)(a +_TLX-), (2.02)
and a > 0, b < 0, a > 0, -6 > 0, and a + (1/y) < 0. As is evident from
inspection of (2.01), the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of
output is zero and the marginal cost of purchasing an additional unit of
advertising is one.
The structure that the demand function f has with respect to price is
exactly the same as Chamberlin's basic model and is illustrated by Figure 1.
Suppose the price that all other firms in the market area are charging is OE.
Firm i takes this as exogenous since it is only one firm among many and has a
negligible effect on the demand of other firms; consequently no other firm has
a reason to react to its price changes. The dd' demand curve in the figure
represents firm i's demand curve when it changes price while all other firms
keep their prices constant. It, which we call the firm demand curve, is the
graph of f as p . varies and p. and A. is held constant. Consequently it is
the demand curve that is relevant to firm i in its maximizing decision with
respect to price. The DD' demand curve traces out the quantity demanded from
firm i when all firms in the market area, including i, change their prices
together. This curve, which we call the fractional industry demand curve, is
the graph of f(p., A. , p.) as p. is varied and A^ is held constant. It is
less elastic than the firm demand curve because it only incorporates changes
December 14, 1982
- 6 -
in the quantities consumers purchase; unlike the firm demand curve it does not
include the effect of consumers switching from high to low price firms.
Figure 2 shows the effect advertising has under our specification (2.02)
of the demand function f. Curve f(p, 0; p) represents i's firm demand curve
when A. is zero, curve f(p, A ; p) represents the altered firm demand curve
when A. is increased to some positive amount, and f(p, A ; p) represents i's
firm demand curve when A. is increased further. The idea behind this
specification is that firm i's advertising increases the likelihood that a
randomly drawn consumer will know how firm i's price compares with the prices
that other firms are charging. If firm i's price is high relative to other
prices, then a consumer who is a regular customer of firm i may decide it is
worthwhile to experiment with the other firms' products provided that his or
her preference for the idiosyncratic characteristics of i's product is not too
strong. Similarly, if firm i's price is low relative to other firm's prices,
then a consumer who is a regular, but not particularly loyal, customer of some
other firm's product may decide to give firm i's product a try.
Curves f(p, 0; p), f(p, A,; p), and f(p, A 2 ; p) all cross the fractional
industry demand curve at the price p because if firm i advertises that it
charges the same price as other competing firms do on average, then this
information concerning its own price should have little if any effect on the
quantity demanded. This is because the improved, comparative information that
the advertising provides consumers reveals only that the firm is providing an
5Chamberlin (1962, p. 131) in his discussion of the effects of
advertising assumes that advertising shifts the firm demand curve outward in a
parallel fashion rather than rotating it. His assumption concerning the
effects of advertising seems neither more nor less plausible than ours. In
fact our hypothesis is that if we had reliable means to measure the effects of
advertising, both effects would be observed in strengths that would vary with
the nature of the industry.
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average value; by itself this information gives consumers no reason to switch
firms. Consequently the overall effect of advertising is to twist the firm
demand curve counterclockwise about point A. The fractional industry demand
curve remains unchanged in Figure 2 because no reason exists why better price
information about competing firms should affect the total quantity demanded.
The justification for parameterizing firm i 's profit function
by p. rather than by the full vector of the other firms' prices has two
aspects. First, the large number of firms means that firms are anonymous both
to each other and to consumers. Therefore both firms and consumers in making
their decisions may summarize their information concerning strategies firms
are using into a set of summary statistics. For example, consumers who are
calculating their optimal search strategies may have estimates of the first
two moments of the distribution of prices across firms. If this is the case
for all consumers, then the demand each firm faces depends only on the firm's
own price and the first two moments of the price distribution.
Second, parameterizing the profit function with a statistic or vector of
statistics has analytical utility. As Chamberlin (1962, ch. IV, sec. 3)
points out, a monopolistically competitive industry can be modeled as a large
number of purely monopolistic firms that are linked by the presence of each
other's individual prices in their demand functions. Equilibrium in the
industry can then be studied through the general equilibrium approach of
calculating a consistent and maximizing set of prices for all the
monopolists. This is hard to do on two levels. At the conceptual level, if
Taking the general equilibrium approach of solving for all the
monopolists' prices simultaneously is essential. Chamberlin 's criticism
(1962, p. 69) of the purely monopolistic approach is that the general
equilibrium approach is normally not taken: "Within any group of closely
related products . . . the demand and cost conditions (and hence the price) of
any one are defined only if the demand and cost conditions with respect to the
December 14, 1982
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the industry consists of I firms where I is a large number, difficulties occur
with this approach in trying to specify how each of the 1-1 competitors'
prices enter into a given monopolist's demand function. At the computational
level, solving I equations simultaneously and studying their comparative
static properties is hard. It is much easier to follow Chamberlin's lead and
do as we are doing in the example of this section: solve and analyze the
three equations that arise as a result of the profit function being
parameterized by a single statistic.
Because of their numbers firms behave as noncooperative Nash competitors
who take p. as given and choose p^ and A. to maximize tt (p . , A.; p.). Firms
are not permitted to employ mixed strategies. We define an equilibrium
configuration for the industry to be a positive integer K, a p = p. = . . .
= p. = . . . and a 3K-vector (q^, pj, A^), . . ., (q K , p^, AR ) of
y
proportions, prices, and advertising levels such that ^ k _. \ = 1»
p
= z
k=i w and
(p , A ) e argmaxir(p, A; p). (2.03)
p, A
for k = 1, . . .,K. The interpretation of this equilibrium definition is
that, for each k, qk proportion of the firms play the strategy (p^, A^). The
We reject mixed strategies for the same reasons that Roberts and
Sonnenschein (1977, p. Ill) object to them, "The problem is to reconcile such
systematic randomization with standard economic theory and observed
behavior. " This is not to say that randomization does not make sense in some
economic models; Butters' (1977) and Varian's (1980) models are cases where
mixed strategies do make sense. Nevertheless our perception is that most
firms do not and, in many cases, can not reasonably carry out mixed strategies
for pricing and product design decisions.
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number of firms is large enough that each firm's impact on the average price
is negligible; therefore the approximation p = p = . . . = p . = . . . is
o
acceptable. The K strategies that are played in an equilibrium are called the
active strategies. If K - 1, then the equilibrium is symmetric; if K > 1, then
the equilibrium is asymmetric.
Analysis. The demand function f is linear in both the firm's own price,
p., nonlinear in its advertising level. A., and linear in the average price of
its competitors, p. It is the nonlinearity with respect to A- that makes each
firms profit function not quasi-concave. As Figure 3 shows A^ has no effect
on the quantity demanded when p. equals p.. When p. is either greater or less
than p then A. decreases or increases respectively the quantity demanded at a
rate that diminishes toward zero as A^ becomes substantial.
The first observation we make about this example is that if the
parameter o , which is the coefficient of A- within the demand function, is
large enough, then (a) no symmetric equilibrium exists and (b) an asymmetric
equilibrium exists where the two strategies that are active are (pi , 0) in
proportion q* and (p*, A*) in proportion 1-q* where p* < p* andA A U
p* = q*p* + (1 - q*)p*. In other words, in the asymmetric equilibrium q*
proportion of the firms do not advertise and charge the high price p* and
1-q* proportion of the firms advertise at the positive level A* and charge the
low price p*.
Part (a) of the observation is argued as follows. Suppose a symmetric
equilibrium exists. Then in equilibrium no firm advertises because advertisng
has no effect on the quantity demanded from a firm whenever that firm, as must
be the case in the symmetric equilibrium, charges the same price as every
See Section 4 for additional discussion of this assumption.
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other firm. But any firm can reduce its price a little below the average
price, advertise this fact, increase its quantity sold, and break the
equilibrium provided the marginal revenue earned by this increased quantity is
larger than the marginal cost of the reduced price and increased advertising.
As 6 is made larger the marginal revenue of this strategy increases ; therefore
for large enough 6 the symmetric equilibrium can not exist.
Part (b) of the observation follows from solving the Kuhn-Tucker , first
order conditions for the firm i's optimal price, p*, in terms of
p and A., i.e., p* = g(p. A.). If this function is substituted into it , to
define ir(p, A.) = tt [g(p. A.), A.; p], then Figure 4 shows the graph of ir as a
function of A,- for different values of p. The value p . is the maximum valuei nan
_ ~ Q
of p for which the only relative maximum of tt occurs at A.=0. The
value p is the minimum value of p for which the only relative maximum
max
of tt occurs for a positive value of A*. For the interval between
p . and p two relative maxima occur: one for A. = and one for A. >
nun max i !
0. Within this interval a p* exists such that tt attains the same value at
both its relative maxima. This p* is the asymmetric equilibrium value of p.
The proportion q* is picked such that p* = q*g(p*, 0) + (l-q*)g(p*, A*) where
A* is the level of A. > that maximizes tt (p*, A. ). Figure 5 shows contours
of tt(p., A.: p*) as a function of p„. and A. when p is set at the value that
produces an asymmetric equilibrium.
Our second observation is that the asymmetric equilibrium in which the
firms divide into two distinct classes is not pathological in the sense of
being structural unstable. By this is meant that if we vary the profit
Q
Recall that A. is restricted to be non-negative.
Andrew Melczer originally calculated this equilibrium and plotted its
contours.
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2function with sufficiently small C perturbations, then the qualitative nature
of the asymmetric equilibrium remains intact in the sense that an asymmetric
equilibrium with two active strategies that are close to the original two
active strategies, (q, p^, 0) and (1-q, p , A ), continues to exist. To show
that this is true, three conditions must hold for small perturbations of the
profit function: (a) the two local maxima must persist, (b) a p' must exist
_*
that is close to p and equalizes the profit levels of the two local maxima,
and (c) a q' must exist that is close to q* and satisfies
p' = q*g(p', 0) + (l-q')g(p'. A') where A' is the level of advertising that
maximizes profits when p = p'.
Assume that, as is the case in Figure 4, p* e (p . , p ). Then the
nan max
Hessian matrix evaluated at the local, positive advertising (interior) maximum
is negative definite and, as a consequence of the implicit function theorem,
that local maximum persists under perturbation. Similarly, at the local, zero
advertising (boundary) maximum both the first partial of it with respect to A^
and the second partial of it with respect to p. are strictly negative, which
means that maximum also persists under perturbation. Therefore condition (a)
holds.
It follows that for some neighborhood of p* the profit levels at the two
local maxima are well defined, continuous, and dif ferentiable as a function
of p. Let
P(p) =Tr(p*(p), 0, p) -Tf(p*(p), A*(p), p) (2.04)
where p* p* and A* are implicit functions of p. The function P is the
difference in profit levels at the zero advertising local maxima and the
positive advertising local maxima. Since it is clearly dif ferentiable , a
December 14, 1982
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small perturbation of the profit function will induce a small perturbation in
it also. The question of structural stability therefore is: does a p exist
such that the perturbed profit function equals zero.
Figure 6 shows that such a p does not necessarily exist. If the
unperturbed difference function's graph is the dotted line with p* being the
equilibrium value of p, then a small perturbation could push the graph upward
as the solid line shows resulting in the non-existence of an equilibrium value
of p. Consequently a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
an equilibrium p for any small perturbation of the profit function, H , is that
the unperturbed difference function, P, be transversal to the p axis; i.e.,
its slope at p* must be nonzero. Figure 6 illustrates this case with the
solid line. This, as a small amount of analysis shows, is the case in which
our example falls.
The third observation we make about this example is that no structurally
stable equilibrium can exist that involves three or more active strategies. A
structurally stable equilibrium with at least three active strategies could
only exist if at least two statistics of competing firms' strategies
parameterized each firm's profit function. To see this suppose that an
asymmetric equilibrium involving three active strategies exists for our
example. We show that this hypothesized equilibrium can not be structurally
stable.
Let (p*A*), (p*A*) and (p*A*) be the three local maxima of the profit
function that are active in the equilibrium. Each is implicitly a function
of p. For p's equilibrium value, p*, the profit levels at each of the three
local maxima are equal. Let the the profit difference function be the vector-
The necessary analysis is in Kumar (1981, ch. II).
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valued function of p:
ir(p*(p), A*(p). p) -ir(p*(p), A*(p), p)
P(p) =
{ _ }• (2.05)
it(p*(p), A*(p), p) -ir(p*(p), A*(p), p)
Since p* is the equilibrium value of p, P(p*) = 0.
Figure 7 graphs the values of P as a function of p. The origin, where
the value of P is the null vector, is the image of p = p* and point A is the
image of some p = p' £ p*. Thus as p varies the image moves along the solid
line that is plotted on the figure. This map must pass through the origin for
an equilibrium to exist. But almost any small perturbation of the profit
function causes a small pertubation of this map (as shown by the dotted
line). Almost certainly, the perturbed map misses the origin, which means no
equilibrium near to the original equilibrium exists. In other words, our
hypothesized, asymmetric equilibrium with three active strategies is not
structurally stable.
More formally, the requirement for structural stability is that the
derivative map,
DP(p): R 1 * R2
, (2.06)
evaluated at p*, the equilibrium value of p, must span the range space. This,
however, is dimensionally impossible. Therefore a three-strategy, asymmetric
equilibrium can never be structurally stable given that only one statistic
parameterizes firms' profit functions. If the profit function were
parameterized by the average of competing firms' advertising levels, A, as
— 9 9
well as by p, then P's derivative map would be from R~ to R*" and three-
strategy equilibria generally would be structurally stable. Underlying this
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is Che general result, which is proved in the next section, that if K
statistics of other firms ' strategies parameterize each firms' profit
function, then only equilibria involving at most K+l active strategies can be
structurally stable.
Model and Results
Let the industry contain I firms and let X be the strategy space of each
firm within the industry. Firms are limited to playing pure strategies. I is
assumed to be a large, finite number and X is a compact, convex subset of R .
The notation x. = (x.., . . ., x ) e X represents a feasible strategy for
1 I L 1 Li
firm i, x = (x , . . ., x ) e X represents a vector of strategies for the
entire industry, and x_. = (x , . . ., x._ , x , . . ., x ) represents the
strategies for all firms in the industry except firm i. Let
z = ((V xk } k=i,K } = {(xr ' ' " V' (q i q K )} (3.01)
represent a configuration of the industry where K is the finite number of
strategies that are active, q^ > is the proportion of firms playing the the
strategy x^, and £<
, 1fc 1« A strategy is active if and only if some
positive proportion of firms are employing it. Finally, let Z denote the set
of configurations that are feasible for the industry.
Competing firms' strategies parameterize the profit function of each firm
1-1 M
through an M-vector of statistics, y = f(x_.), where f: X + R is a twice
continuously dif ferentiable function that is symmetric in all its arguments.
Let Y be f's range. Since I is large, we make the approximation that f(x_i )
December 14, 1982
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a f(x) = f(z) where the x and z notations for describing the industry's
configuration are used interchangably . In the example of the previous section
the function f took the form
y = f(z) =z£
=1 q kp k
. (3.02)
More generally f might calculate several moments of the distribution of
competing firms' strategies. The linear structure of (3.02) is not important
for the paper's main result; only for one of the paper's secondary results is
the linearity important.
Let it: X x Y * R be the twice continuously dif ferentiable profit
function that is common to all the firms. Thus if firm i follows strategy x-
and the industry has configuration z, then firm i 's payoff is it [x. ; f(z)].
Given this basic structure, an industry is the triplet <X, tt , f>.
Firms are profit maximizers that take the strategies of other firms as
given. Equilibrium is therefore of the Nash-Cournot variety and is defined to
be any configuration z e Z such that, for all i.
x. e argmax tt [^ ; f(z)]. (3.03)
1
5 e X
Let firms' best response set when faced with the configuration z be
R[f(z)] = R(y) = { x | x. e argmax ir fe; f(z)]}, (3.04)
1 L
C E X
In equilibrium only elements of the best response set, R(y*), can be active
strategies.
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Let C ={h: X x Y + R | h £ C } be the set of continuously twice
dif f erentiable real-valued functions defined on X x Y. The function
2 2
h. £ C is a horaotopic perturbation of a function h e C if and only
A A
I
aI
2
if h = h + Xg for some g e C and scalar X. These perturbations have the
property that, for X small enough, not only is h. close to h, but the first
and second derivatives of h. are also close to the first and second
derivatives of f.
An industry configuration z* is a structurally stable equilibrium if, for
all homotopic perturbations it of it , a a > exists such that, for
all X £ (0, X), an equilibrium z*(X ) exists for it that is close to the
A
original equilibrium z*. The distance between two equilibria, z*
and z*(X), that have the same number of active strategies is
5[z*, z*(X)] = max II [x*
,
q* ] - [x*(X), q*(X)]ll (3.05)
k
12
where II . II is the Euclidean metric. If, for a particular perturbation it , a
continuous dif ferentiable function z(X ) exists such that, for all
X £ (0, X), z(X) is an equilibrium configuration, then the condition for
closeness is satisfied. This is because the continuity of z(X) implies that,
for any a > 0, a X ' > exists such that, for all X e (0, X '),
5 [z*. z(X)] < a.
Suppose that R(y*) has K elements where K is finite. Since tt is
continuously dif ferentiable and R(y) has a finite number of elements,
12 In our model two equilibria that have different numbers of active
strategies are defined as being not close. One could, however, define
closeness in sensible ways that would allow equilibria with different numbers
of active strategies to be close. For example, if the M-vector of statistics
y* adequately describes the equilibrium, then two equilibria could be defined
as close if their respective y* vectors are close.
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each x,* z R(y*), (k = 1 , . . . , K) is a nondegenerate local maximum
of it ( . ; y*). Pick a particular maximum x*. If it is an interior point of
X, then it solves the first order conditions for a maximum of tt ( .
;
y*):
3rr(x*; y*)
1 = 0. (3.06)
The nondegeneracy of the maximum implies that the Hessian matrix is
nonsingular, which means that the implicit function theorem may be applied.
Therefore a neighborhood N (y*) of y* and a dif ferentiable function x^(y)
exist such that, for all y £ N (y*),
5tt [x (y), y]
\ = 0, (3.07)3xk
i.e., x, (y) traces out the movement of it's kth relative maximum as y varies.
If x* is not an interior point, then two cases are possible. First, if a
binding constraint keeps x* on X's frontier rather than straying outside, then
the implicit function theorem applies to the resulting constrained maximum
problem and again a dif ferentiable Xi (y) exists that traces the movement of
the maximum. If x* is on the frontier without any constraint being binding,
then, with some extra work, the implicit function theorem still applies
piecemeal: a x^(y) exists that is continuous, but not necessarily
dif f erentiable.
If N(y*) is restricted to be a subset of the intersection of the K
neighborhoods N (y*), then on N(y*) the K functions, xk (y), all exist.
Make N(y*) small enough so that no other local maximum of tt ( . ; y) exists
whose value is as great as the values tt ( . ; y) attains at the K local maxima
i i 13the functions Xi (y) describe. This can be done because |R(y*)| = K, which
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means thac the value tt ( . ; y*) takes on at any local maxima other than the K
local maxima that are elements of R(y*) is strictly less that the value
it ( . ; y*) takes on at those K global maxima. This strict inequality is
preserved within N(y*) provided it is made small enough. The implication of
defining N(y*) in this way is that, for any y e N(y*), only the points x^(y)
are candidates for being elements of R(y). Therefore, to summarize this and
the previous paragraph, within some neighborhood N(y*) of y* continuous
functions x(y) = {x.(y), . . ., x^Cy)} exist that trace K of n's relative
maxima, provided |R(y*)| is finite.
Given the existence of the continuous functions x(y), we define the
K— 1
function P : N(y*) + R to be
if [x.(y); y] - tt [x
2
(y); y]
P(y) =
{
... }• (3.08)
Note that P(y) = is a necessary condition for every one of the K strategies
(x,(y), .... x^(y)) to be elements of the best response set R(y).
Our main result is:
Theorem 1. Suppose an industry, <X, tt , f>, has an equilibrium
configuration z* = { (x* x*), (q* q*)} . If K > M+l
.
then the equilibrium is structurally unstable.
Thus, if the number of active strategies in the equilibrium configuration
|R(y)| denotes the cardinality of the best response set.
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exceeds one plus the number of statistics that parameterize the profit
function, then the equilibrium is unstable.
Proof. Suppose z* = { (x* ^^ ^f' • • •» 9$)'} is an equilibrium
configuration where K > M+l. We will show that if it is perturbed, then almost
surely no configuration z close to z* exists that can be an equilibrium
configuration for the industry, which is sufficient to establish that z* is
not structurally stable. Let y* = f(z*). Consider first the case where K
= JR(y*.)| and is finite; the other cases are treated separately at the end of
the proof.
The domain space of P, which is N(y*), has dimension M since it is a
subset of Y. By assumption this is less than K-l, the dimension of the range
space. This implies that the range of P is a closed set of measure zero in
k—
1
R . Let P be the perturbation of P that the pertubation, it. , of it
A A
induces ; the range of P is also a set of measure zero in R . Since the
A
ranges of both P and P have measure zero and are not identical, almost every
point in P's range is not a point in P 's range. Consequently, almost surely
A
no y e N(y*) exists such that P. (y) = 0.
Therefore, for every y eN(y*), a k exists such that \(y) i R(y)« A.
necessary condition for two configurations, z* and z to be close together is
that they have the same number of active strategies. Thus every configuration
z close to z* violates a necessary condition for z being an equilibrium
strategy. This means the equilibrium z* is not structurally stable and
completes the proof for the case where K = |R(y*)|.
Consider next the case where R(y) is finite and K * |R(y)|. The subcase
K > |R(y*)| is impossible because every active strategy in equilibrium must be
The perturbation of tt induces perturbations in all the x^(y) functions.
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an element of the best response set. In the event of the other subcase, K
< |R(y*)
I
, elements of R(y*) other than those that are active in z* might
become active as y varies within N(y*) The resulting equilibrium
configuration, even if it had K active strategies, could not be close
to z* because every element of R(y*) is isolated from every other of its
elements. Therefore this subcase does not offer any possibilities beyond
those that the K = |R(y*)| case offered and the proof presented for it
suffices.
Suppose, as the last case, that |R(y*)| is infinite. Pick any perturbing
function g; then it = it + Xg. Let 8. (y) be the best response set of the
perturbed profit function it . Assume that z* is structurally stable and that
A
K-l > M. Since z* is structurally stable, for a > small enough,
a X > exists such that, for all X £ (0, X), an equilibrium configuration
z(X) exists such that 5 (z., , z*) <a. Sard's Theorem implies that, for
any X z (0, X), |R. (y)| is almost certainly finite even though |RQ (y*)| is
infinite. In other words, no matter what shape tt has, almost any pertubation
of it has a finite number of relative maxima.
Define tt ' = it + X 'g and tt' = tt' +vg =tt + (X' +v)g where X ' e (0, X).
Since |R (y*)| is almost certainly finite, the cases proved above for finite
best response sets apply to it'. Specifically, z(X'), which is an equilibrium
configuration of tt ' , can not be a structurally stable equilibrium
configuration of tt ' . Define z ' (v ) = z(X'4v). By assumption z ' (v ) is an
equilibrium configuration of ir,
,
provided v is small enough. By the
construction of tt ' , z ' (v ) is also an equilibrium configuration of ttJ. This
15Even if |R(y*)| is infinite, K must be finite since the number of firms
is large but finite and firms can not employ mixed strategies.
See the theorem on p. 43 of Guillemin and Pollack. (1974).
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last fact, however, almost surely contradicts the fact that z ' is a
structurally unstable eauilibrium. Therefore z* can not be structurally
stable as was assumed.!
The generality of Theorem 1 can be appreciated by considering its
validity if the assumptions on the continuity and differentiability of it and f
are dropped and replaced by the assumptions that both are functions of bounded
variation. The proof that the result does remain valid, which we sketch here,
remains essentially unchanged from above except that the K functions Xi (y)
need redefinition. Suppose z* = { (x* . . ., x*), (q* ^v^ ^- s an
equilibrium configuration such that K > M+l. Let y* = f(z*). Assume that K =
| R(y ) i and is finite. The arguments presented in Theorem l's proof continue
to apply; therefore the assumption entails no loss of generality. Pick
an a > 0. We show that, for almost every small pertubation of ir (where the
perturbing function g has bounded variation), no equilibrium configuration z
can exist such that 5(z, z*) < a, i.e., z* can not be structurally stable.
Given a , around each point x* (k = 1, . . . , K) neighborhoods N(x£) can
be established that have the property: if z is configuration such that
x^ i N(x*), then 5(z, z*) >a, i.e., z and z* are not close unless x^
e N(x*) for all k. If these K neighborhoods are not disjoint, then
redefine a to be small enough for them to be disjoint. Define K functions
x^(y): Y * N(x*) each having the property:
x, (y) = argmax w (£ ; y) (3.09)
5 6 N(x*)
*k-
if such maximal point exists and, otherwise, ~\(y) - x/ where x/ is a fixed,
arbitrary point within N(x*).
Given the functions xi,(y)i the function P(y) is defined as before and,
December 14, 1982
- 22 -
because z* is an equilibrium configuration, P(y*) = 0. Thus the origin is an
M
element is P's range. Recall that P's domain Y is contained in R' and its
K— 1
range is contained within R . By assumption K-l > M; therefore the range of
K— 1
P within R is a space of measure zero. Any arbitrary perturbation
of it causes P's range to be perturbed. Since that range is of measure zero,
after perturbation it almost certainly does not contain the origin. Therefore
z* is not a structurally stable equilibrium configuration, which completes our
sketch of the proof for the case where f and tt are assumed only to be
functions of bounded variation.
Theorem 2 identifies conditions that are sufficient to guarantee
structural stability of an equilibrium configuration for which K
_<_ M+l. Its
statement is based on the observation that for a given profit function, tt , an
symmetric equilibrium configuration z* must satisfy M+K equations:
*
P(y ) = 0, K-l equations;
f[(x(y*), q*)] - y* = 0, M equations; (3.10)
q* -1=0, 1 equation;
where the vectors y and q are the M+K unknowns and the functions P(y) and x(y)
are as defined above. Let G: R + R be the mapping defined by the
left-hand side of the equation system (3.10). Define an interior equilibrium
configuration z* = (x*, q*) to be any equilibrium configuration such that, for
all k, x* is an element of X's interior.
Theorem 2. Suppose an industry, <X, tt , f>, has an interior
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equilibrium configuration z* = (x*, q*) for which y* = f(z*), K
C_M+1, and K = |R[f(y*)]|. If the Hessian of the mapping G is
nonsingular at (y*, q*), then z* is a structurally stable
equilibrium.
Our example in Section 2 shows that these sufficient conditions are not
vacuous because an industry exists that satisfies them.
Proof. Let G^ be the perturbation of G that a perturbation
of it induces. Since (a) z* is an interior equilibrium and (b) the Hessian of
G at (y*, q*) is nonsingular, the implicit function theorem implies that, for
some scalar X > 0, dif f erentiable functions y(X ) and q(X ) exist such
that G(x(X), q(X)) = for all X e [0, X]. Consequently the equilibrium z* is
structurally stable.
I
In Theorems 1 and 2 we have assumed the existence of equilibrium. If a
particular linear structure is placed on the statistics function, f, then
existence of equilibrium is guaranteed. Specifically, the linear structure
that is sufficient for existence of equilibrium is
y = f(z) = Z*
ml qkg(xk ) (3.11)
M
where g: X * It is the continuously dif ferentiable function that evaluates
the contribution that firm j's kth active pure strategy x makes toward the
statistics y.. In the example of Section 2 the function g took the simple
form gCp^, A.) = p^/n. More generally g might be used to calculate M moments
of the distribution of competing firms' strategies. Nevertheless the important
feature of f is its linear structure, not the specific form of g, which may be
any continuously dif ferentiable function.
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Theorem 3. If an industry, <X, ir , f>, , has a statistics function f
endowed with the linear structure of (3.11), then an equilibrium z*
exists.
Proof of this result is contained in Kumar (1981, theorem 3.2.2). It is not
presented here because it is a straightforward application of a theorem by
Glicksburg. The only obscure aspect of the proof is showing that Y is compact
and convex as a result of f having the linear form (3.11) and X being compact
a 18and convex.
Concluding Comments
The main result we have shown is that in the monopolistic competition
model if competitors' strategies affect each firm's profits only through M
statistics, then in a structurally stable equilibrium firms employ at most M+l
distinct strategies. The essential condition that drives our result is the
aggregation of competitive information. If no aggregation takes place, then
our result places no binding restriction on the number of distinct strategies
that the industry's firms may be observed employing. For example, if every
Maskin and Dasgupta (1977) quote this result of Glicksburg (1952).
18Strictly speaking, the proof shows that for any profit function an
equilibrium exists. The proof does not restrict the number of active
strategies to be finite. This, however, is an immaterial problem because if
the only symmetric equilibrium involves an infinite number of active
strategies, then a small perturbation of the profit function results in the
number of active strategies in the equilibrium collapsing to a finite
number.
K
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competitors ' price enters the demand function of every firm, then in effect
every firm's profit function is parameterized by 1-1 statistics of its 1-1
competitors ' strategies. Our result states that the number of active
strategies in equilibrium is at most one more than this number of statistics;
therefore at most I distinct strategies can be employed in equilibrium. But
since I is the total number of firms, every firm can potentially employ a
strategy distinct from the strategies of all other firms. Hence if no
aggregation of competitive information takes place, no restriction is placed
on the character of structurally stable equilibria.
A key assumption on which our main result is based is that I, the number
of firms, be large enough that every firm faces essentially identical values
of the aggregate statistics, i.e., the approximation f(x ) * f(x) = f(z) is
good. If I is small, then this approximation is not good and pure strategy
equilibria x* that approximate the equilibrium configuration z* (which is
calculated on the basis of I being very large) may not exist. Kumar (1981,
ch. IV) has analysed a specific, economically interesting model in which, for
a small number of firms, a pure stategy equilibrium always exists that
approximates the asymmetric equilibrium configuration of the large number
case. We are uncertain at the present time to what extent the properties of
his example generalize to other models.
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